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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Allen Lee Moore appeals from the district court’s restitution order. Because the State
requested restitution after the time allowed by the district court, and the only reason for the delay
was that the State had miscalendared the deadline, the district court abused its discretion when it
allowed the late filing and awarded restitution. This court should vacate the restitution order.

Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings
Mr. Moore pled guilty to felony aggravated battery and misdemeanor simple battery in
August 2017, and in exchange the State agreed to recommend a unified sentence of ten years,
with two years fixed, and a period of retained jurisdiction. (R., pp.64–71; 10/24/17 Tr., p.6,
L.16–p.7, L.24.) On October 30, 2017, the court sentenced him to a unified term of eight years,
with two years fixed, and placed him on probation. (R., pp.81–86.) At the State’s request, the
court left restitution open for sixty days. (R., p.85; 10/24/17 Tr., p.16, L.11–p.17, L.6, p.25,
Ls.14–21.)
On January 23, 2018, the State filed a motion for restitution (R., pp.91–92), which the
court addressed at a hearing on March 22, 2018. The prosecutor acknowledged that the motion
was roughly thirty days late, explaining:
[Y]ou had given us 60 days. I emailed our restitution end of the department and
told them that it was due in 60 days. It is most common for us to have 90 days,
and so they had mis-calendared it and filed it within 90 days. And then
Mr. Schou had notified me that we had filed it late and he’d be objecting to it. . . .
....
I always make it a habit to email the restitution and tell how many days they have,
and so I had told her 60. . . .
...
And then I don’t put it on my own calendar because, frankly, that’s not my job.
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(3/22/18 Tr., p.7, L.21–p.8, L.14.) Later on, the prosecutor added that she did not know what
due date her office gave to the victims (3/22/18 Tr., p.12, Ls.20–21), but that she filed their
restitution request on January 23, the same day that she received the final restitution amount
from the Crime Victims Compensation Program (the “CVCP”) (3/22/18 Tr., p.9, Ls.16–23). She
conceded that “the proper method would have been for us to ask for an extension of time, but we
did not receive that final statement by Crime Victims Compensation until January 23rd, which is
the reason that we submitted the motion and order on that date.” (3/22/18 Tr., p.10, Ls.1–7.)
Mr. Moore acknowledged that he was not prejudiced by the late filing (though he also
asserted prejudice was irrelevant to the analysis) and that he had no argument on the merits of
the restitution request, but he objected to the filing as untimely. (3/22/18 Tr., p.12, Ls.6–13,
p.15, Ls.17–18.) Relying on I.C. § 19-5304 and State v. Ferguson, 138 Idaho 659, 662 (Ct. App.
2002), he argued that he hadn’t heard anything from the State to indicate that the delay was
“necessary.” (3/22/18 Tr., p.11, Ls.7–20.) The State had not claimed they could not have gotten
the information earlier or that the CVCP and Medicaid would not have complied with the
deadline had they been made aware of it. (3/22/18 Tr., p.11, L.20–p.12, L.5.)
The court initially indicated it was going to deny the State’s request as untimely,
explaining, “I did enter an order retaining that for a period of 60 days, and it does not implicate
or affect in any way the civil remedies available to victims. They are always free to file suit.”
(3/22/18 Tr., p.8, Ls.16–20.)

But after hearing additional argument, it decided to award

restitution. It explained that the sixty-day order was not jurisdictional and was just to ensure that
the case wrapped up in a timely manner. (3/22/18 Tr., p.14, Ls14–22.) It went on:
I go back and look at the statute itself, and it says, “Unless the Court determines
that an order of restitution would be inappropriate or undesirable, it shall order a
defendant found guilty of any crime which results in economic loss to the victim
to make restitution to the victim.” That’s a mandatory directive. And so on
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further contemplation, I will relieve the State of the deadline under these
circumstances, not because, necessarily, the victims coordinator’s office was
dilatory, but because it does appear that—at least as to part of the restitution
requested, that it was simply—the information wasn’t available. And I am not
sure what the story is with Medicaid, but—and I also perceive no real injury to the
defendant. He caused the damage. If it’s owed—and I haven’t heard about
objections on the merits—
....
I looked at the submitted materials submitted by the State, and it did appear that it
was the right people and the right dates, and they are hospital charges.
So with that, I will—
....
grant the oral request for relief from the 60-day deadline.
(3/22/18 Tr., p.14, L.23–p.15, L.1.) The court later clarified that it was holding that the late
filing for both the CVCP and Medicaid was because the information was not available. (3/22/18
Tr., p.17, Ls.18–24.) Finally, the court rejected Mr. Moore’s argument that although “the
restitution statute does contemplate restitution being ordered . . . unless inappropriate, it also
does say when it should be ordered”—“at the time of sentencing or such later date as deemed
necessary by the Court.” (3/22/18 Tr., p.16, Ls.4–17 (referencing I.C. § 19-5304(6).) It said,
given the fact that that deadline really is not hard and fast by statute, and the
reason I put it there is to have a time where these things come to an end, but I am
not intending to get—but I don’t think that that procedural device should overrule
the mandates of the statute.
In other words, I don’t think a procedure should get in the way of the
merits.
(3/22/18 Tr., p.17, L.25–p.18, L.7.)
The court later ordered Mr. Moore to pay $1,650.39 in restitution (R., pp.126–27), and he
timely appealed (R., pp.139–40).
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ISSUE
Did the district court abuse its discretion when it accepted the State’s late restitution request and
awarded restitution because the only reason for the delay was that the State had miscalendared
the deadline?

4

ARGUMENT
The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Accepted The State’s Late Restitution Request
And Awarded Restitution Because The Only Reason For The Delay Was That The State Had
Miscalendared The Deadline
According to I.C. § 19-5304(2), “[u]nless the court determines that an order of restitution
would be inappropriate or undesirable, it shall order a defendant found guilty of any crime which
results in an economic loss to the victim to make restitution to the victim.” Further, “[r]estitution
orders shall be entered by the court at the time of sentencing or such later date as deemed
necessary by the court.” I.C. § 19-5304(6) (emphasis added).
This Court reviews restitution awards for an abuse of discretion.

State v. Nelson,

161 Idaho 692, 695 (2017); State v. Cunningham, 161 Idaho 698, 700 (2017).
To determine whether the district court abused its discretion, this Court evaluates
whether the district court: (1) correctly perceived the issue as one of discretion;
(2) acted within the outer boundaries of its discretion and consistently with
relevant legal standards; and (3) reached its decision by an exercise of reason.
State v. Wisdom, 161 Idaho 916, 919 (2017). “The district court’s factual findings with regard to
restitution will not be disturbed on appeal if supported by substantial evidence.”

State v.

Corbus, 150 Idaho 599, 602 (2011) (citing State v. Lombard, 149 Idaho 819, 822 (Ct. App.
2010)). Substantial evidence is “relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept to support
a conclusion.” Wisdom, 161 Idaho at 919 (quoting State v. Straub, 153 Idaho 882, 885 (2013)).
The district court abused its discretion by entertaining the State’s tardy motion for
restitution because it did not exercise reason and did not act consistently with the relevant legal
standards.

As an initial matter, there is no evidence in the record to support the court’s

conclusion that the amount of restitution was not available to the victims in time to comply with
its sixty-day deadline. (3/22/18 Tr., p.15, Ls.5–16, p.17, Ls.18–24.) Instead, the record shows
that that information was available to the victims well before the deadline, but that at least some
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of that information was not actually provided to the State until after, presumably because the
State had miscalendared the deadline. (3/22/18 Tr., p.7, L.21–p.8, L.14, p.12, Ls.2–21.) The
State filed documentation from both Medicaid and the CVCP to support its restitution request,
and that documentation was printed long before the sixty-day deadline expired on December 29,
2017. The statement from Saint Alphonsus for Mr. Hansen’s medical bills states, “Current Date:
8/18/2017,” on the bottom, right-hand corner.

(R., p.93.)

The Medicaid documents for

Ms. Moore are dated “Aug 18, 2017,” on the bottom left-hand corner. (R., pp.94–95.) The letter
from the Crime Victims Compensation Program, which was dated January 23, 2018, attached
documents that say “Printed on 11/17/2017” in the top left-hand corner.

(R., pp.96–97.)

Therefore, the court’s finding that the victims were unable to provide the restitution
documentation to the State within the sixty-day deadline is not supported by substantial
evidence; the necessary documents were generated months before.
As a result, the district court did not act consistently with I.C. § 19-5304(6) when it
awarded restitution outside of the sixty-day window because it was not actually “necessary” to
enter the restitution order at such a late date. The required information was in fact available, and
the State’s failure to file its restitution request within the time allowed by the court simply
because it did not properly calendar the deadline clearly could not make the late filing
“necessary.” For this reason, the court’s conclusion that procedure should not “overrule the
mandates of the statute” missed the mark. (3/22/18 Tr., p.17, L.25–p.18, L.7.) Idaho Code § 195304 itself creates a procedural bar to ordering restitution after sentencing unless “deemed
necessary by the court.” I.C. § 19-5304(6). Finally, as discussed by the court during its initial
ruling, denying the restitution request “does not implicate or affect in any way the civil remedies
available to victims. They are always free to file suit.” (3/22/18 Tr., p.8, Ls.16–20.) The district

6

court therefore abused its discretion by accepting the State’s tardy restitution request and by
awarding restitution.

CONCLUSION
Mr. Moore respectfully asks that this Court vacate the district court’s restitution order.
DATED this 20th day of November, 2018.

/s/ Maya P. Waldron
MAYA P. WALDRON
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 20th day of November, 2018, I caused a true and
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KENNETH K. JORGENSEN
DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL
E-Service: ecf@ag.idaho.gov

/s/ Evan A. Smith
EVAN A. SMITH
Administrative Assistant
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